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Abstract:	Various	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	favored	(or	neglected)	by	John	Bell	in	the	context	of	his	nonlocality	theorem,	are	compared	and	discussed.	
	
1.	Varenna	1970		I	met	John	Bell	for	the	first	time	at	the	Varenna	conference	of	1970	(d’Espagnat,	1971).	I	had	been	invited	on	the	suggestion	of	Eugene	P.	Wigner,	who	had	already	helped	me	to	publish	my	first	paper	on	the	concept	that	was	later	called	decoherence	–	to	appear	in	the	first	issue	of	Foundations	of	Physics	a	few	months	after	the	conference	(Zeh,	1970).	This	concept	arose	from	my	conviction,	based	on	many	applications	of	quantum	me-chanics	to	composite	systems	under	various	conditions,	that	Schrödinger’s	wave	func-tion	in	configuration	space,	or	more	generally	the	superposition	principle,	is	universally	valid	and	applicable.	In	particular,	stable	narrow	wave	packets	can	represent	classical	configurations,	while	their	superpositions	may	define	new	individual	properties	–	such	as	“momentum”	defined	as	a	plane	wave	superposition	of	different	positions.	Superposi-tions	of	macroscopically	different	properties,	on	the	other	hand,	are	regularly	irreversi-bly	“dislocalized”	(distributed	over	many	degrees	of	freedom)	by	means	of	interactions	described	by	the	Schrödinger	equation.	The	corresponding	disappearance	of	certain	lo-
cal	superpositions	(“decoherence”)	seems	to	explain	the	phenomenon	of	a	classical	world	as	well	as	the	apparent	occurrence	of	quantum	jumps	or	stochastic	“events”	–	see	Sect.	4	or	(Zeh,	2013)	for	a	historical	overview	of	the	conceptual	development	of	quan-tum	theory.	So	I	had	never	felt	any	motivation	to	think	of	“hidden	variables”	or	any	other	physics	behind	the	successful	wave	function.		Therefore,	I	was	very	surprised	on	my	arrival	in	Varenna	to	hear	everybody	dis-cuss	Bell’s	inequality.	It	had	been	published	a	few	years	before	the	conference,	but	I	had	
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either	not	noticed	it	or	not	regarded	it	as	particularly	remarkable	until	then.	As	this	ine-quality	demonstrates	that	the	predictions	of	quantum	theory	would	require	any	con-
ceivable	reality	possibly	underlying	the	nonlocal	wave	function	to	be	nonlocal	itself,	I	simply	found	my	conviction	that	the	latter	correctly	describes	individual	reality	con-firmed.	For	example,	I	had	often	discussed	the	conservation	of	total	spin	or	angular	mo-mentum	in	an	individual	decay	process,	where	it	requires	nonlocal	entanglement	be-tween	the	fragments	at	any	distance	in	a	form	that	was	later	called	a	“Bell	state”.	There-fore,	this	entanglement	cannot	represent	“just	information”;	information	must	be	physi-cal	–	anything	else	would	be	homeopathy.	Although	the	first	results	from	crucial	Bell	experiments	(presented	at	Varenna	by	Clauser,	Horne,	Shimony	and	others)	were	still	preliminary,	they	assured	me	that	every-body	would	share	my	conviction	as	soon	as	Bell’s	argument	had	become	generally	known	and	understood.	I	certainly	did	not	expect	that	fifty	years	later	many	physicists	would	still	search	for	loopholes	in	the	experiments	or	for	justifications	of	non-locality	beyond	the	wave	function,	or	even	deny	any	microscopic	reality	in	order	to	avoid	con-tradictions	or	absurd	consequences	that	result	from	the	prejudice	of	a	reality	that	has	to	be	local	(such	as	in	terms	of	particles	or	fields).			 So	I	was	particularly	glad	to	hear	about	John’s	announcement	of	a	talk	“On	the	assumption	that	the	Schrödinger	equation	is	exact”	one	or	two	years	after	Varenna	at	a	meeting	Bernard	d’Espagnat	had	organized	in	Paris.	This	title	seemed	to	represent	my	own	ideas,	but	I	will	have	to	come	back	in	Sect.	2	to	what	he	really	meant.			 Before	he	published	his	inequality	in	1964,	John	Bell	had	shown	von	Neumann’s	refutation	of	hidden	variables	to	be	insufficient.	(The	publication	of	this	paper	had	been	delayed	until	1966	by	some	accidents.)	Von	Neumann’s	claim	had	often	been	cited	in	order	to	defend	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	with	its	irrational	“complementarity”	concept	against	such	proposals.	In	Varenna,	Bell	began	his	talk	by	arguing	that	all	physi-cal	systems	are	described	by	means	of	two	different	concepts:	classical	properties	L	and	a	wave	function	y.	The	latter	he	suspected	to	be	merely	“subjective”	(the	traditional	ar-gument	for	searching	for	hidden	variables).	Today	we	would	then	call	it	an	epistemic	concept,	representing	incomplete	information,	but	“information”	would	only	make	sense	for	him	with	respect	to	the	essential	questions	“about	what?”	and	“by	whom?”	This	re-mains	true	although	an	objective	“state”	of	incomplete	information	(an	unspecified	en-
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semble	of	unknown	elementary	states)	may	then	be	operationally	defined	by	a	certain	(incomplete)	preparation	procedure.		It	was	this	kind	of	clarity	in	pointing	out	misconceptions	that	always	impressed	me	in	discussions	with	John,	or	in	his	talks	and	publications	(Bell,	1987).	He	never	shared	the	“pragmatic	logic”	of	many	physicists	who	regard	arguments	as	correct	just	because	they	somehow	lead	to	the	expected	or	empirically	known	result.	Another	exam-ple	was	his	objection	to	some	operational	arguments	used	at	the	conference	by	axiomat-ic	quantum	theorists	who	suggested	the	application	of	certain	“superselection	rules”	in	order	to	replace	superpositions	by	ensembles	whenever	the	required	observables	were	not	realizable	for	some	general	reason.	He	insisted	that	not	being	able	in	practice	to	dis-tinguish	between	a	superposition	and	an	ensemble	consisting	of	its	components	does	not	prove	them	to	be	the	same.	This	conceptual	confusion	may	also	occur	in	connection	with	decoherence	when	one	uncritically	interprets	the	reduced	density	matrix	of	a	sub-system	as	representing	an	ensemble	rather	than	entanglement	(see	Sect.	3).	Bernard	d’Espagnat	had	already	coined	the	terms	“proper”	and	“improper	mixtures”,	respective-ly,	to	distinguish	these	two	cases.	A	related	third	example	that	comes	to	my	mind	is	his	very	politely	formulated	criticism	of	Hepp’s	attempt	to	justify	ensembles	of	measure-ment	outcomes	by	means	of	the	purely	formal	limit	of	an	infinite	number	of	subsystems	or	degrees	of	freedom	(Bell,	1987:	Ch.	6).			 The	assumption	of	two	different	realms	of	physics	(quantum	and	classical:	y	and	
L)	represented	consensus	among	most	physicists	at	that	time	–	even	though	one	knew	from	the	early	Bohr-Einstein	debate	that	macroscopic	variables,	too,	had	to	obey	the	uncertainty	principle	in	order	to	avoid	inconsistencies.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	ma-jority	of	physicists,	most	participants	at	the	conference	agreed	that	the	absence	of	a	well-defined	borderline	between	these	two	realms	represented	a	severe	defect	that	seemed	to	call	for	new	physics.	Decoherence	was	not	yet	known	as	a	possible	effective	borderline,	while	mesoscopic	quantum	physics	had	hardly	been	seriously	studied	yet.	In	fact,	when	I	began	presenting	decoherence	arguments	to	my	colleagues	in	those	years,	the	usual	objection	was	that	“quantum	mechanics	does	not	apply	to	the	environment”.		 John	then	continued	his	talk	by	explaining	his	arguments	against	von	Neumann’s	exclusion	of	hidden	variables,	gave	an	outline	of	David	Bohm’s	theory	(which	had	moti-vated	these	arguments),	and	finally	derived	his	inequality,	whose	violation,	predicted	by	
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quantum	theory,	would	exclude	local	hidden	variables	if	confirmed	by	experiment.	This	conclusion	seemed	to	be	a	great	surprise	and	to	appear	almost	unacceptable	to	many	participants.	Some	young	and	also	some	not-so-young	physicists	there	were	strongly	motivated	by	dialectic	materialism	(this	conference	took	place	in	Italy,	two	years	after	1968!).	They	could	not	accept	any	“idealistic”	interpretation	of	physical	phenomena,	and	sometimes	tried	to	propose	very	naïve	classical	models	that	had	all	to	be	in	conflict	with	quantum	theory	somewhere.	However,	Bohr	had	correctly	concluded	already	in	1924	(when	his	attempt	with	Kramers	and	Slater	had	failed)	that	“there	can	be	no	simple	solu-tion”	to	the	problems	presented	by	the	quantum	phenomena.	Nonetheless,	in	Bell’s	(and	my)	opinion	this	was	no	reason	to	abandon	the	whole	concept	of	reality,	which	in	a	the-ory	must	be	reflected	by	a	consistent,	universally	valid	and	successful	description	of	Na-ture.	For	him,	the	renunciation	of	reality	would	be	the	end	of	physics	(as	I	understood	him).	Very	probably,	this	conviction	was	the	major	motivation	in	all	his	endeavors	re-garding	the	foundation	of	quantum	mechanics,	but	his	theorem	revealed	that	quantum	reality	must	be	in	strong	contrast	to	traditional	concepts.			 At	Varenna,	I	was	particularly	interested	in	Bryce	DeWitt’s	talk	on	the	Many	Worlds	interpretation,	because	I	had	mentioned	Everett’s	ideas	myself	as	the	only	re-maining	(but	possible)	solution	if	the	Schrödinger	equation	was	assumed	to	be	exact,	universal	and	complete.	But	I	felt	a	bit	confused	when	I	saw	DeWitt	translate	Everett	into	the	Heisenberg	picture.	For	me,	Everett’s	main	point	was	a	unitarily	evolving	wave	function	of	the	universe.	He	had	attended	lectures	given	in	Princeton	by	von	Neumann,	who	had	described	the	measurement	process	in	purely	wave	mechanical	terms,	assum-ing	the	pointer	position	to	be	represented	by	a	moving	narrow	wave	packet	rather	than	a	classical	variable.	This	picture	of	quantum	mechanics	(which	Wigner	always	meant	when	he	spoke	of	its	“orthodox	interpretation”)	seems	to	have	also	influenced	Richard	Feynman	(Zeh,	2011).	Only	much	later	did	I	understand	that	for	DeWitt	and	David	Deutsch,	“Many	Worlds”	meant	many	trajectories	in	configuration	space	(or	many	Feynman	paths),	while	for	Everett	and	me	this	concept	meant	many,	in	excellent	approx-imation	dynamically	“autonomous”,	wave	packets,	which	may	possibly	even	form	an	overcomplete	set	(see	Sect.	4).	For	example,	while	Deutsch	regards	a	quantum	computer	as	an	example	for	many	worlds	in	action,	in	Everett’s	sense	they	must	all	remain	part	of	one	“world”	in	order	to	lead	to	one	quasi-classical	result	that	can	be	observed	and	used	by	humans.	Only	if	there	were	macroscopically	different	intermediary	states	of	the	com-
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puter,	could	their	superposition	give	rise	to	different	“worlds”	by	their	decoherence	–	and	thus	ruin	the	quantum	computer.	These	different	formal	representations	of	“reality”	(by	classical	configurations	or	by	wave	packets)	are	also	relevant	to	Bell’s	different	in-terpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	which	I	will	now	discuss.		
2.	Bell	on	Bohm’s	Theory	Although	Bohm	and	Hiley	were	present	at	Varenna	(as	well	as	Andrade	e	Silva,	who	rep-resented	Louis	deBroglie),	I	first	understood	Bohm’s	theory	(Bohm,	1952)	when	study-ing	Bell’s	Varenna	contribution	(Bell,	1987:	Ch.	4).	He	presented	this	theory	as	a	“simple	example”	for	hidden	variables,	even	though	it	was	in	contrast	to	his	introductory	re-marks:	it	neither	replaced	the	wave	function	y	nor	explained	it	in	terms	of	an	ensemble	of	hidden	variables.	In	more	recent	language,	this	theory	is	“y-ontic”,	but	in	addition	it	assumes	the	existence	of	hidden	variables	l	that	are	here	identified	with	the	pre-quan-tum	variables	(such	as	particle	positions	and	field	amplitudes):	it	is	not	“y-complete”.		So	these	variables	are	isomorphic	to	the	arguments	of	his	wave	function,	while	the	ap-pearance	of	particles	(such	as	photons)	for	all	quantum	fields	remains	an	open	problem.	Nonetheless,	this	theory	allowed	Bohm	to	assume	the	Schrödinger	equation	to	be	exact	(the	same	as	in	Everett’s	later	theory!),	and	a	classical	configuration	of	the	world	to	be	dynamically	guided	by	the	arising	wave	function	instead	of	obeying	Hamilton’s	equa-tions.	Bell	meant	essentially	Bohm’s	theory	by	the	title	of	his	talk	that	I	first	heard	in	Par-is,	where	the	Schrödinger	equation	is	assumed	not	only	to	be	exact,	but	also	to	be	uni-versal.	There	are	no	strictly	classical	variables	L	any	more	(they	are	simply	functions	of	the	l’s),	but	Bell	regarded	it	as	an	important	advantage	that	Bohm’s	theory	does	not	need	the	“notoriously	vague	concept	of	a	reduction	of	the	wave	packet”.		 However,	he	also	remarked	that	“what	happens	to	the	hidden	variables	during	and	after	a	measurement	is	a	delicate	matter”.	In	my	opinion	this	is	a	serious	weak	point	of	the	theory,	since	the	l’s	have	to	be	postulated	to	form	a	statistical	distribution	with	probabilities	given	by	|y(l)|2,	while	only	one	of	the	trajectories	is	assumed	to	describe	reality.	Although	this	distribution	is	dynamically	consistent	with	Bohm’s	dynamics,	(1)	no	plausible	motivation	for	this	statistical	assumption	(in	contrast	to	the	individually	treated	wave	function)	is	given,	and	(2)	the	probabilities	would	have	to	change	under	a	
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change	of	information	by	measurements,	although	no	physical	carrier	of	this	infor-mation	is	taken	into	account	(“information	by	whom?”).	This	comes	close	to	the	crucial	assumption	of	an	external	(human?)	observer	in	the	Copenhagen	interpretation.		 Supporters	of	Bohm’s	theory	often	present	special	applications	in	order	to	illus-trate	it,	although	it	is	evident	already	from	its	general	construction	that	all	its	observable	predictions	must	be	in	accord	with	traditional	quantum	mechanics.	Therefore,	they	can-not	serve	to	confirm	Bohm’s	theory.	However,	these	trajectories	appear	plausible	only	in	simple	cases,	such	as	single-particle	scatterings.	In	general,	they	may	have	very	surpris-ing	properties,	and	little	to	do	with	what	one	would	expect	or	what	we	seem	to	observe	(Zeh,	1999).	In	my	opinion,	this	fact	eliminates	the	major	motivation	for	this	theory,	since	its	“traditionalistic”	trajectories	can	neither	be	observed	nor	remembered:	they	are	observationally	meaningless.		On	the	other	hand,	Bohm	was	perhaps	the	first	physicist	to	seriously	consider	en-tangled	wave	functions	for	macroscopic	systems.		Shelly	Goldstein	even	claimed	that	Bohm	anticipated	the	decoherence	concept	when	he	discussed	measurements	in	his	theory.	This	is	a	bit	of	an	overstatement	and	a	misunderstanding.	In	order	to	describe	
successions	of	measurements,	Bohm	had	to	discuss	how	the	probability	distribution	of	his	classical	configurations	l	is	restricted	by	all	previous	measurements	to	the	carrier	of	some	small	“effective”	component	of	the	wave	function	(essentially	identical	with	“our”	Everett	branch),	and	this	means	first	of	all	that	these	branches	have	to	remain	dynami-cally	autonomous	for	some	time	(the	way	we	are	using	wave	functions	in	practice).	This	is	similar	to	Mott’s	early	treatment	of	a-particle	tracks	in	the	Wilson	chamber,	which	did	
not	yet	take	into	account	subsequent	decoherence	of	the	droplet	positions	by	their	en-tanglement	with	an	unbounded	environment.	Only	this	real	(irreversible)	decoherence	explains	why	different	“quasi-classical”	wave	packets	forming	one	superposition	never	meet	again	in	configuration	space	in	order	to	interfere,	that	is,	why	the	required	auton-omy	holds	“forever”	in	practice.	Within	these	autonomous	branches,	wave	functions	for	macroscopic	variables	are	restricted	to	narrow	wave	packets	that	resemble	classical	points.	Bohm	might	then	have	noticed	that	his	presumed	fundamental	variables	l	would	become	obsolete	if	these	branches	themselves	were	“selected”	in	some	sense.	In	mesoscopic	cases,	decoherence	theory	requires	detailed	calculations	for	realistic	envi-ronments,	which	were	performed	during	the	eighties	by	Wojciech	Zurek,	Erich	Joos,	and	many	others.			
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	 During	the	decade	following	Varenna,	John	Bell	presented	various	versions	of	his	talk	about	the	“assumption	that	the	Schrödinger	equation	is	exact”.	Like	many	other	fundamental	papers	at	that	time,	they	were	often	first	published	in	the	informal	Episte-mological	Letters,	since	established	journals	were	still	reluctant	to	accept	papers	on	in-terpretational	issues	of	quantum	theory.	Only	after	his	inequality	had	become	known	to	allow	crucial	experiments	to	be	performed	in	laboratories,	did	this	situation	slowly	change	–	one	of	John’s	historically	most	important	achievements.			 A	slightly	modified	and	extended	version	of	these	talks	(for	a	special	purpose)	was	published	in	1981	under	the	new	title	“Quantum	mechanics	for	cosmologists”	(Bell	1987:	Ch.	15).	It	contains	a	number	of	important	statements.	Talking	about	Bohm,	he	says	that	“nobody	can	understand	this	theory	until	he	is	willing	to	think	of	y	as	a	real	objective	field	rather	than	a	probability	amplitude”.	This	is	in	explicit	contrast	to	his	in-troductory	remarks	at	Varenna	about	y	as	a	“subjective”	concept.	As	only	one	set	of	l’s	is	assumed	to	be	real	(representing	one	point	somewhere	in	the	myriads	of	branches	of	the	universal	wave	function),	he	compares	y	with	the	Maxwell	fields,	which	are	similarly	assumed	to	exist	even	where	no	charged	“test	particles”	are	present.	But	he	adds	that	“it	is	in	terms	of	the	l”	(which	he	now	calls	x)	“that	we	would	define	a	psycho-physical	par-allelism	–	if	we	were	pressed	to	go	so	far”.	Therefore,	he	now	called	Bohm’s	“hidden”	variables	“exposed”,	although	their	exposure	(together	with	their	very	existence)	re-mains	a	model-specific	hypothesis.	The	l’s	may	appear	“more	real”	than	y	to	the	tradi-tional	mind	because	they	are	defined	as	local	“beables”.	This	is	also	why	observable	quantum	non-locality	is	often	understood	as	requiring	a	spooky	action	at	a	distance	ra-ther	than	the	consequence	of	a	nonlocal	beable:	the	“real”	wave	function.	(In	classical	context,	we	similarly	prefer	to	believe	that	we	see	objects	rather	than	–	more	realistical-ly	–	the	light	reflected	by	them,	or	even	the	nerve	cells	excited	by	the	light	in	the	retina	and	in	the	brain.	In	this	classical	picture,	however,	all	these	physical	elements	and	their	interactions	are	local	and	can	be	regarded	as	empirically	well	established.)		 When	mentioning	Everett’s	interpretation	as	another	possibility	for	the	Schrö-dinger	equation	to	be	exact,	John	usually	disregarded	it	as	“extravagant”	–	not	for	being	wrong	(Bell	1987:	Ch.	20).	This	position	appears	natural	from	a	traditional	point	of	view.	Similarly,	Stephen	Weinberg	declared	in	an	interview	about	his	recent	book	on	quantum	mechanics	(for	Physics	Today	Online	of	July	2013)	that	“this	effort	[of	not	conceptually	distinguishing	the	apparatus	or	the	physicist	from	the	rest	of	the	world]	may	lead	to	
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something	like	a	‘many	worlds’	interpretation,	which	I	find	repellent.”	But	he	had	to	add:	“I	work	on	the	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	from	time	to	time,	but	have	gotten	nowhere.”	In	fact,	there	are	strong	emotions	but	hardly	any	convincing	arguments	against	Everett.	This	has	even	led	to	some	“mobbing”	by	traditionalists	of	all	kinds	against	Everettians	or	even	against	a	fundamental	role	of	decoherence.	In	(Bell,	1987:	Ch.	11),	Bell	raised	the	objection	that	Everett’s	branches	are	insufficiently	defined	or	arbitrary,	but	precisely	this	ambiguity	has	been	removed	by	decoherence	(see	Sects.	3	and	4).		After	John	had	given	a	version	of	his	talk	at	Heidelberg	in	about	1980,	we	had	a	brief	correspondence,	where	I	tried	to	point	out	to	him	that	Bohm’s	theory	is	just	as	ex-travagant	as	Everett’s	in	the	sense	that	Bohm’s	wave	function	contains	the	same	myriads	of	components	that	are	regarded	as	“many	worlds”	by	Everettians.	The	only	difference	is	that	all	but	one	of	them	are	called	“empty”	by	Bohmians.	Nonetheless,	all	the	empty	parts	of	the	wave	function	are	assumed	to	exist,	too,	in	order	to	avoid	the	collapse!	We	also	debated	the	relation	between	the	concept	of	reality	and	that	of	“heuristic	fictions”	in	physics	on	this	occasion,	but	the	correspondence	led	to	no	obvious	result.	However,	it	may	have	had	some	consequences	a	few	years	later	(see	Sect.	3).				 When	re-reading	Bell’s	“Quantum	theory	for	cosmologists”	for	the	preparation	of	this	paper,	I	discovered	another	astonishing	remark	about	Everett.	Bell	initially	points	out	that	he	is	not	quite	sure	whether	he	understands	Everett	correctly,	but	then	claims	a	“previously	unknown	close	relationship	between	Everett	and	Bohm”.	He	says	(surpris-ingly)	that	“all	instantaneous	classical	configurations	l	are	supposed	to	exist”	in	Ever-ett’s	theory	(the	assumption	that	he	regarded	as	extravagant).	This	interpretation	may	come	close	to	Deutsch’s	identification	of	(many)	“worlds”	with	a	continuum	of	trajecto-ries	in	configuration	space	(cf.	Sect.	1).	Deutsch	has	indeed	repeatedly	called	Bohm’s	theory	a	“many-worlds	theory	under	permanent	denial”.	Bell’s	remark	indicates	that	he,	too,	would	prefer	beables	to	be	local	–	probably	a	major	reason	for	his	favor	for	Bohm’s	theory.	So	Bohm	and	Deutsch	presume	classical	concepts	(points	in	configuration	space);	this	explains	why	they	both	do	not	need	decoherence	to	justify	them.*	If	we	did	instead	define	“worlds”	to	consist	of	trajectories	for	macroscopic	objects	plus	wave	functions	for																																																									*	Note	added	after	publication:	This	may	similarly	apply	to	Vaidman’s	definition	of	branches	in	Sect.	12.5	of	this	book	if	he	requires	them	not	to	contain	any	nonlocal	entanglement	(such	as	total	spin	states	for	separate	particles).	Such	states	do	not	require	any	action	at	a	distance	in	order	to	violate	Bell’s	inequality,	but	they	are	nonetheless	nonlocal.	
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microscopic	ones,	we	would	be	back	searching	for	Bohr’s	borderline	between	two	dif-ferent	realms	of	physics,	now	using	much	improved	but	nonetheless	as	yet	unsuccessful	experimental	techniques.	In	contrast,	Everett	interpreted	the	world	completely	and	sole-ly	in	terms	of	wave	functions	(he	was	von	Neumann’s	student).	A	relation	to	classical	concepts	may	then	be	provided	only	in	terms	of	wave	packets	in	configuration	space.	This	means	that	Everett	is	conceptually	not	closely	related	to	Bohmian	mechanics	with	its	classical	variables	l,	but	rather	to	Bell’s	favorite-to-come:	collapse	theories.			
3.	Collapse	Theories	In	1987,	John	Bell	surprised	his	admirers	by	a	drastic	change	of	mind.	Inspired	by	(Ghi-rardi,	Rimini	and	Weber,	1986),	he	now	advocated	for	collapse	theories	(Bell,	1987:	Ch.	22).	That	is,	he	dropped	the	assumption	that	the	Schrödinger	equation	is	exact	(as	it	is	in	Bohm’s	mechanics),	and	instead	supported	what	he	had	previously	called	the	“notori-ously	vague	collapse”	–	albeit	in	a	newly	specified,	hypothetical	form.	If	correct,	this	pro-posal	would	avoid	all	those	myriads	of	“other”	branches	of	the	wave	function	which	he	found	extravagant	in	Everett’s	interpretation,	and	which	had	to	be	regarded	as	“empty”	in	Bohm’s.	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	he	abandoned	Bohm	completely.	He	may	simply	have	started	an	independent	attempt	to	search	for	a	solution	of	the	quantum	problems	in	terms	of	a	realistic	theory,	but	his	radical	change	of	concepts	may	also	indi-cate	that	he	was	not	quite	happy	any	more	with	his	previous	favorite.			 When	Johann	von	Neumann	first	formulated	his	collapse	or	reduction	of	the	wave	function	in	Chaps.	V	and	VI	of	his	book	(von	Neumann,	1932),	he	felt	motivated	by	the	need	not	only	to	explain	definite	pointer	positions,	but	also	to	facilitate	a	psycho-physical	parallelism	that	is	applicable	to	local	observers	in	spite	of	the	nonlocality	of	the	generic	wave	function.	These	two	different	though	related	intentions	reflect	Bohr’s	and	Heisenberg’s	slightly	different	understandings	of	quantum	measurements.	While	the	former	insisted	that	indeterministic	measurement	outcomes	have	to	be	objectively	de-scribed	in	terms	of	classical	pointer	states	(which	could	thereafter	be	observed	in	a	tra-ditional	way	by	interaction	with	classical	media	and	observers),	the	latter	had	originally	regarded	the	measured	properties	(including	particle	positions)	as	being	created	by	
their	observation	by	humans.	This	difference	left	many	traces	in	the	history	of	quantum	
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measurement	theory,	but	both	aspects	seem	to	be	relevant	in	some	way	even	for	an	on-tic	interpretation	of	the	wave	function	(see	Sect.	4).			 The	GRW	collapse	was	clearly	meant	to	describe	an	objective	physical	process	(for	a	phenomenon	that	Bohr	had	regarded	as	not	dynamically	analyzable).	Therefore,	these	authors	concentrated	on	a	process	of	“spontaneous	localization”	for	the	wave	func-tions	of	macroscopic	variables.	For	this	purpose,	they	postulated	a	non-unitary	and	irre-versible	“master	equation”	instead	of	the	von-Neumann	equation	for	the	density	matri-ces	of	all	isolated	physical	systems.	The	precise	form	and	strength	of	its	non-unitarity	had	to	be	adjusted	in	order	to	describe	Born’s	probabilities	as	part	of	this	new	funda-mental	dynamical	law.	Von	Neumann’s	equation	is	equivalent	to	the	linear	Schrödinger	equation,	which	they	now	assumed	to	apply	only	approximately	in	a	microscopic	limit.	They	also	assumed	tacitly	that	this	density	matrix	describes	an	(ever-growing)	ensemble	of	potential	wave	functions,	but	the	problem	is	that	such	an	ensemble	is	not	uniquely	determined	by	the	density	matrix,	nor	can	the	latter	distinguish	between	ensembles	and	an	entanglement	of	the	considered	system	with	others.		Indeed,	immediately	after	their	paper	had	appeared,	Erich	Joos	was	able	to	demonstrate	(Joos,	1987),	that	their	master	equation	can	be	well	understood,	and	even	be	made	precise,	within	unitary	quantum	mechanics	as	a	consequence	of	the	unavoida-ble	interaction	of	macroscopic	systems	with	their	realistic	environment	(later	called	decoherence).	This	mechanism	could	be	quantitatively	confirmed	in	several	mesoscopic	cases,	while	it	obviously	applies	to	all	macroscopic	ones.	However,	it	describes	growing	entanglement	rather	than	a	transition	from	pure	states	into	ensembles	(such	as	those	of	different	measurement	outcomes).	Therefore,	two	questions	arise:	(1)	how	would	GRW’s	master	equation	have	to	be	interpreted	in	order	to	describe	measurements,	and	(2)	what	does	the	undeniable	environmental	decoherence,	which	can	hardly	accidentally	lead	precisely	to	the	required	density	matrix	(as	though	it	were	an	ensemble),	mean	for	the	measurement	process?		In	order	to	answer	the	first	question,	John	Bell	proposed	a	nonlinear	stochastic	(“quantum	Langevin”)	equation	for	the	dynamics	of	individual	wave	functions.	This	new	equation	would	thus	have	to	replace	the	Schrödinger	equation.	The	ensemble	of	poten-tial	future	wave	functions	thereby	arising	can	be	represented	by	a	density	matrix	that	would	then	obey	GRW’s	master	equation.	His	specific	model	postulated	that	jumps	of	
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single-particle	wave	functions	into	slightly	more	localized	partial	waves	occur	sponta-neously	with	Born-type	probabilities.	He	assumed	the	time	scale	for	these	jumps	to	be	of	order	1015	s,	but	for	the	center	of	mass	of	a	multi-particle	object	this	time	scale	would	have	to	be	divided	by	the	number	of	particles,	and	so	become	sufficiently	short	for	such	collective	variables.	However,	he	also	noticed	and	listed	a	number	of	problems,	such	as	the	entanglement	between	particles	or	the	generalization	of	his	proposal	to	QFT	(others	have	later	been	added),	although	he	expressed	hope	that	they	can	be	overcome.	I	doubt	that	this	has	ever	been	achieved	for	this	kind	of	model,	but	there	exists	a	wealth	of	simi-lar	and	also	quite	different	possibilities	for	a	collapse	mechanism,	which	can	be	falsified	only	one	after	another	and	when	defined	exactly.	Only	in	that	case	would	they	share	this	property	of	being	falsifiable	with	Everett’s	interpretation,	which	could	be	ruled	out	by	the	discovery	of	an	appropriate	violation	of	global	unitarity	(Arndt	and	Hornberger,	2014).	Therefore,	the	possibility	of	a	dynamical	collapse	still	exists	in	principle,	and	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	none	of	its	proposed	versions	has	ever	been	verified	by	experi-ments.	While	the	confirmation	of	such	hypothetical	non-unitarity	would	close	this	fun-damental	debate	forever,	environmental	decoherence	must	remain	important,	as	it	seems	to	describe	all	as	yet	observed	apparent	(local)	non-unitarities.		The	major	reason	for	this	undecided	situation	is	that	any	conceivable	collapse	dynamics	would	have	to	be	carefully	shielded	against	all	competing	decoherence	effects	in	order	to	be	confirmed	–	an	almost	impossible	requirement	in	the	macroscopic	realm.	As	the	reduced	density	matrix	arising	from	decoherence	cannot	be	locally	distinguished	from	that	of	an	ensemble,	it	is	sufficient	FAPP	(for	all	practical	purposes	–	a	later	often	misused	term	that	Bell	invented	in	his	last	paper	“Against	measurement”	(Bell,	1989)).		However,	interaction	with	the	environment	can	never	describe	the	transition	of	a	global	pure	state	into	an	ensemble	of	possible	outcomes	–	it	merely	describes	the	dislo-calization	of	all	macroscopic	superpositions	by	means	of	their	spatially	spreading	entan-glement.	Even	if	the	environment	or	the	apparatus	were	described	by	an	ensemble	of	
different	initial	states	(incomplete	information	about	microscopic	initial	conditions),	as	often	suggested	in	the	hope	that	this	ensemble	might	then	lead	to	the	expected	ensemble	of	different	outcomes,	the	conclusion	of	a	resulting	superposition	of	different	outcomes	would	remain	valid	for	each	of	its	individual	members.	This	very	general	argument	has	often	been	emphasized	by	Eugene	Wigner,	who	pointed	out	that	the	density	matrix	characterizing	the	initial	ensemble	merely	hides	the	lasting	entanglement.	The	latter	
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must	ultimately	give	rise	to	a	global	superposition	of	“many	worlds”	for	each	individual	state.	For	similar	reasons,	no	kind	of	classical	“noise”	(represented	by	an	uncertain	Ham-iltonian,	for	example)	would	explain	the	required	ensemble,	whereas	the	often	men-tioned	interaction	with	quantized	gravity	is	quantum	mechanically	just	a	special	(though	not	very	relevant)	form	of	environmental	decoherence.	A	genuine	collapse	would	have	to	be	explicitly	postulated	and	empirically	confirmed	as	a	fundamental	deviation	from	unitarity.	The	omni-present	formation	and	spreading	of	initially	absent	entanglement,	on	the	other	hand,	seems	to	form	the	general	“master	arrow	of	time”	characterizing	our	universe.	In	this	way,	it	also	forms	the	physical	basis	for	the	general	concept	of	time-asymmetric	“causality”	(Zeh,	2007).		In	contrast	to	Bohr’s	above-mentioned	understanding,	collapse	theories	assume	the	wave	function	(though	not	the	Schrödinger	equation)	to	apply	universally,	and	therefore	to	form	a	complete	ontic	concept.	This	wave	function	must	then	in	principle	also	describe	the	brain	with	its	expected	specific	role	in	a	psycho-physical	parallelism.	In	the	absence	of	Bohm’s	l’s,	and	under	his	new	assumption	of	spontaneous	jumps,	Bell	now	suggested	that	consciousness	be	related	to	such	(again	model-specific)	“events”,	while	von	Neumann	had	assumed	consciousness	to	be	related	in	the	sense	of	a	psycho-physical	parallelism	to	the	observers’	quantum	states,	which	he	assumed	to	be	formed	by	means	of	his	vaguely	defined	collapse.	Some	kind	of	a	psycho-physical	connection	is	certainly	required	in	order	to	understand	how	our	subjective	observations	are	related	to	the	hypothetical	real	world	(that	is,	how	subjective	observations	come	about	in	objective	terms).	Einstein	spoke	of	the	“whole	long	chain	of	interactions	from	the	object	to	the	observer”	that	we	must	understand	in	order	to	know	what	we	have	observed.			
4.	Consequences	of	decoherence	Already	in	my	first	paper	on	decoherence	(Zeh,	1970),	I	had	explicitly	pointed	out	that	entanglement	with	the	environment	(in	that	paper	called	“quantum	correlations”)	does	
not	lead	to	the	apparently	required	ensemble	of	possible	outcomes	(a	proper	mixture).	It	merely	explains	the	absence	of	certain	local	superpositions,	which	had	often	been	at-tributed	to	fundamental	“superselection	rules”	or	a	global	stochastic	collapse.	Since	no	hints	of	a	collapse	had	ever	been	directly	observed,	I	suggested	an	interpretation	similar	to	Everett’s	–	see	also	(Zeh,	2013:	Sect.	4)	for	details.	(Some	Oxford	philosophers	have	
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recently	“rediscovered”	this	successful	combination	of	decoherence	and	Everett.)	This	very	possibility	is	sufficient	to	demonstrate	that	Bell’s	claim	that	“the	wave	function	must	either	be	incomplete	or	not	always	right”	cannot	be	upheld.	In	several	subsequent	papers	during	the	seventies	I	even	tried	to	learn	more	about	the	physical	localization	of	consciousness	in	quantum	mechanical	terms	by	using	the	single-sum	Schmidt	canonical	representation	for	entangled	states	(assuming	a	fundamental	local	observer	system	in	the	brain,	for	example),	but	this	attempt	did	not	turn	out	to	be	particularly	helpful.	Ob-jectively,	we	can	argue	only	in	terms	of	“robust”	properties,	such	as	memory	(physically	realized	in	data	storage	devices	or	by	decohered	variables	in	the	brain	–	even	though	these	are	only	intermediary	concepts	in	the	long	chain	between	object	and	subject).	Such	robust	states	describe	quasi-classical	properties,	which	may	form	discrete	sets	for	digital	devices	or	neuronal	frameworks.	In	the	general	case,	they	were	later	called	“pointer	states”	by	Zurek	(Zurek,	1981),	whose	readers,	however,	may	have	misunder-stood	them	according	to	the	title	of	this	paper	as	forming	a	proper	mixtures	after	a	decoherence	process	–	see	also	(Camilleri,	2009).	Precisely	this	“naïve”	misunderstand-ing	of	decoherence	seems	to	have	considerably	contributed	to	its	popularity,	while	the	introduction	of	new	names,	such	as	“einselection”,	“quantum	Darwinism”	or	“existential	interpretation”,	did	not	add	any	new	contents	to	this	theory.	Most	workers	in	the	field	of	decoherence	have	indeed	restricted	their	interest	to	the	effects	of	the	environment	on	the	density	matrices	of	local	systems.	This	is	sufficient	for	most	practical	purposes,	and	it	allows	one	to	understand	the	pseudo-concept	of	“complementarity”	simply	as	a	consequence	of	different	couplings	to	the	environment	by	means	of	different	measurement	devices.	Because	of	this	decoherence	phenomenon,	existing	proposals	for	a	fundamental	collapse	are	mostly	attempts	to	mimic	the	effects	of	environmental	decoherence.	They	are	thus	based	on	a	prejudice	that	arose	before	deco-herence	was	understood	as	a	unitary	process.	However,	there	are	far	more	other	possi-bilities	for	a	collapse	along	Einstein’s	“whole	long	chain”	which	could	finally	explain	in-dividual	states	of	awareness	(all	we	know	with	certainty)	in	an	objective	dynamical	way.	As	decoherence	describes	apparent	transitions	into	ensembles	and	apparent	quantum	jumps,	which	can	even	be	experimentally	confirmed	as	forming	smooth	processes,	it	has	indeed	often	been	misinterpreted	as	a	derivation	of	the	probabilistic	collapse	from	the	Schrödinger	equation.	(I	remember	authors	claiming	that	decoherence	saves	us	from	the	conclusion	of	Many	Worlds,	although	precisely	the	opposite	is	true!)	This	misuse	of	the	
	 14	
density	matrix	has	a	long	tradition	in	measurement	theory,	and	John	was	certainly	right	to	object	against	it	also	in	connection	with	decoherence.	But	his	critical	position	is	then	often	misused	in	turn	as	an	argument	to	entirely	dismiss	the	essential	role	of	decoher-ence	in	measurements.	In	order	to	understand	what	decoherence	“really”	means,	one	has	to	analyze	the	consequences	of	interactions	with	the	environment	on	the	individual	global	wave	function	(similar	to	Bell’s	formulation	of	the	stochastic	collapse	mechanism	for	individual	states	described	in	Sect.	3).		The	essential	insight	that	originally	led	to	the	concept	of	decoherence	was	that,	for	dynamical	reasons,	entanglement	must	be	far	more	common	in	macroscopic	systems	than	had	ever	been	envisioned	or	taken	into	account.	It	had	been	overlooked	as	long	as	unitarity	was	believed	to	apply	only	to	microscopic	systems.	Ironically,	though,	global	unitarity	is	able	to	explain	local	non-unitarity.	However,	it	is	not	the	formal	diagonaliza-tion	of	the	thereby	arising	reduced	density	matrices	of	all	systems	that	explains	“effec-tive	ensembles”,	but	rather	the	fact	that	an	ever-increasing	number	of	components	of	the	wave	function	become	dynamically	independent	of	one	another	(“autonomous”)	in	this	way.	In	particular,	this	progressive	entanglement	means	that	nonlocal	superpositions	cannot,	in	practice,	be	relocalized	any	more	in	order	to	describe	some	“recoherence”.	This	situation	is	analogous	to	the	justification	of	Boltzmann’s	H-theorem	in	deterministic	particle	mechanics,	where	the	µ-space	distribution	is	very	unlikely	to	be	later	affected	within	reasonable	times	by	nonlocal	many-particle	correlations	that	were	previously	created	in	chaotic	collisions.	These	correlations	must	nonetheless	persist	in	order	to	preserve	Gibbs’s	ensemble	entropy	for	distributions	on	G-space.	Similarly,	the	perma-nent	“branching”	of	the	wave	function	into	autonomous	components	that	can	never	in-terfere	any	longer	is	quite	compatible	with	Schrödinger’s	determinism	and	the	high	di-mensionality	of	configuration	space	(using	plausible	cosmic	initial	conditions).	As	long	as	there	are	no	empirical	indications	for	a	collapse	mechanism,	the	existence	of	unob-servable	branches	of	the	wave	function	(“worlds”)	in	addition	to	the	observed	one	is	thus	not	a	matter	of	“philosophy”,	but	of	dynamical	consistency.		One	may	then	easily	recognize	that	different	pointer	positions,	dead	and	alive	cats,	and	different	states	of	awareness	of	an	observer	(but	none	of	their	superpositions)	can	only	exist	separately	within	such	autonomous	branches	of	the	wave	function.	There-fore,	the	various	autonomous	“versions”	of	each	observer	that	similarly	arise	from	deco-herence	can	only	represent	separate	“subjective	identities”	(“many	minds”)	–	even	
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though	they	may	have	shared	their	early	histories.	Because	of	their	emerging	dynamical	autonomy,	they	can	only	remember	the	histories	of	their	own	branches,	including	con-sequences	of	superpositions	that	had	existed	before	their	decoherence.	Statistical	weights	according	to	the	squared	norms	of	the	branch	wave	functions	have	to	be	postu-lated	for	the	sole	purpose	of	correctly	“selecting”	our	subjectively	observed	version	by	chance;	they	have	no	meaning	from	the	objective	“birds	perspective”	that	is	described	by	unitary	dynamics.	These	empirically	observed	weights,	which	explain	the	frequencies	of	results	in	series	of	measurements	observed	by	us	(“Born’s	rule”),	cannot	be	derived	from	the	objective	part	of	the	theory,	but	they	are	the	only	dynamically	consistent	ones	in	the	sense	that	they	are	conserved	under	the	Schrödinger	dynamics.	In	contrast	to	other	con-ceivable	weights	they	are	thus	not	changed	by	later	branchings	–	and	so	give	rise	to	the	concept	of	“consistent	histories”	in	terms	of	effective	wave	functions.		So	we	have	to	conclude	that	the	indeterminism	we	observe	in	the	quantum	phe-nomena	does	not	reflect	an	objective	dynamical	law.	Rather,	it	is	a	consequence	of	the	branching	histories	of	all	observers	in	a	quantum	world.	While,	in	the	classical	descrip-tion,	the	subjective	decision	about	who	is	“you”	among	all	conscious	observers	existing	in	the	deterministically	evolving	universe	occurs	only	once	for	your	lifetime,	it	is	repeat-ed	many	times	every	second	with	respect	to	your	permanently	arising	new	“versions”.	At	least,	this	would	be	the	consequence	of	global	unitarity;	it	is	not	just	a	fiction.	It	is	also	the	reason	that	a	wave	function	often	appears	to	us	as	representing	“just	information”.	One	may	regard	a	theory	as	incomplete	if	it	does	not	determine	the	individual	subjective	observer,	but	this	“defect”	would	then	also	apply	to	classical	(Laplacean)	theories.		Slightly	generalizing	John	Bell’s	terminology,	one	may	say	that	the	autonomy	of	individual	branches	arising	from	decoherence	allows	us	to	replace	the	formal	“plus”	of	their	superposition	by	an	effective	phase-independent	“and”,	while	an	“or”	is	meaningful	only	with	respect	to	the	individual	version	of	a	potential	observers.	In	this	Everettian	sense,	Heisenberg’s	subjective	interpretation	of	measurement	outcomes	as	being	creat-
ed	by	their	observation	may	thus	be	justified	at	last	–	although	not	in	terms	of	funda-mental	particle	or	other	classical	concepts.	Without	taking	into	account	this	“subjective	individualization”	of	measurement	results	(an	effective	projection	in	Hilbert	space)	we	could	not	even	prepare	pure	states	for	microscopic	systems	in	the	laboratory,	where	we	perform	series	of	measurements	for	this	purpose	in	order	to	continue	the	experiment	only	with	the	appropriate	outcomes.		
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Unfortunately,	John	Bell	never	seriously	considered	this	version	or	variant	of	Ev-erett	(as	far	as	I	know).	He	may	still	have	regarded	it	as	“extravagant”	because	of	the	myriad	versions	of	each	observer	that	have	to	arise	according	to	the	Schrödinger	equa-tion.	Collapse	models,	in	contrast,	may	postulate	that	similarly	defined	branches	of	the	wave	function	all	but	one	disappear	from	reality,	but	an	observer,	who	can	only	exist	in	a	branch,	does	not	have	to	bother	whether	many	other	versions	of	himself	do	exist	in	oth-er	autonomous	branches,	or	rather	have	disappeared	from	reality	–	unless	he	is	one	of	those	rare	non-pragmatic	physicists	such	as	John	Bell.		A	pragmatic	physicist	will	in	any	case	use	the	collapse	FAPP	as	soon	as	decoher-ence	(understood	as	the	dislocalization	of	initially	microscopic	superpositions)	has	be-come	“real”	rather	than	virtual	(irreversible	in	practice)	after	a	measurement-like	pro-cess,	in	which	a	microscopic	difference	led	to	different	macroscopic	consequences.	This	onset	of	environmental	decoherence	defines	a	natural	position	for	the	Heisenberg	split.	Decoherence	also	allows	us	approximately	to	describe	all	robust	properties	of	macro-scopic	systems	in	classical	terms,	while	most	others	can	locally	be	treated	by	conven-tional	statistical	methods,	such	as	retarded	master	equations	(Zeh,	2007).		The	popular	objection	that	“this	apparent	collapse	applies	only	FAPP”	means	no	more	than	that	this	solution	of	the	problem	is	not	what	John	Bell	(and	many	other	physi-cists)	had	expected	and	hoped	for.	It	is	nonetheless	sufficient,	without	being	based	on	any	novel	and	speculative	postulates.	We	have	learned	from	Everett	that	we	do	not	have	to	expect	the	collapse	to	represent	an	objective	physical	process	that	may	some	day	be	further	specified	and	confirmed	by	experiments	(although	the	possibility	of	such	a	genu-ine	non-unitarity	can	never	be	excluded	with	certainty).	The	“effective	collapse	FAPP”	is	just	a	convenient	picture,	representing	the	situation	of	the	subjective	observer	in	his	changing	branch.	So	it	cannot	(and	need	not)	be	defined	exactly,	and	it	may	even	be	as-sumed	to	“act”	superluminally.	Events	may	consistently	be	assumed	to	“occur”	even	in	cases	where	they	will	never	be	observed:	the	phase	relations	which	must	still	exist	be-tween	different	“world”	components	according	to	the	Schrödinger	equation	become	ir-relevant	for	all	potential	observers	in	their	branches	as	a	consequence	of	decoherence.	However,	this	reasonable	convention	(in	a	dynamically	consistent	quantum	world	that	may	be	assumed	to	describe	reality)	seems	to	be	the	source	of	many	misconceptions,	such	as	counterfactuals,	new	logics,	complementarity,	an	“uncertain”	reality,	“it	from	bit”,	and	similar	terminology	that	John	Bell	found	neither	very	helpful	nor	meaningful.		
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